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Abstract
Crises such as COVID-19’s have inequitable impacts on different countries, various
population groups and diverse sectors of society and the economy. Areas of work and
employment were met with a lot of challenges worldwide, and in particular in countries like
Egypt with a large sector of vulnerable and precarious workers. This policy paper addresses
the question of employment security both in response to crises such as COVID-19, and on the
long term. To do so, the research maps ‘vulnerable work’, including informal labor, labor in
the gig economy, self-employed and other types of precarious work. It then assesses Egypt’s
policy responses to COVID-19 with regards to the issues of unemployment and informal labor,
including by assessing the efficacy of the irregular workers’ fund and the diverse methods
used to finance the crisis.
Although some of those responses were in the right direction, their shortcomings
revealed much deeper structural obstacles within employment relations and existing labor
market vulnerabilities. This research thus provides policy recommendations, both on the
short term in response to the crisis, as well as longer term to address vulnerability and
precariousness in the world of employment in Egypt.

3

Employment Security in Egypt in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Rethinking Policies and
Practices
The Pandemic and Post-Pandemic Research and Innovation Initiative at the American University in Cairo

Table of contents:
1. Introduction: Background, goals and methodologies of the research.
2. Mapping Vulnerabilities and Precariousness in the Egyptian Labor Market
3. Assessments of COVID-19 Policy Interventions
4. Policy Recommendations: Towards Long-term reforms and short-term responses to the
coronavirus

4

Employment Security in Egypt in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Rethinking Policies and
Practices
The Pandemic and Post-Pandemic Research and Innovation Initiative at the American University in Cairo

Part 1. Introduction
The crisis of COVID-19 represents both a moment of rupture as well as a continuity for
vulnerable labor in Egypt and worldwide. Globally, the International Labour Organization (ILO)
has reported an average loss of working hours of 10% in the second quarter of 2020, compared
to the last quarter of 2019, which amounts to the loss of 305 million jobs worldwide.3 This large
number nonetheless obscures the unequal brunt born by young people, informal workers, and
female labor globally, and particularly in Africa and Central Asia. In the Middle East region,
in particular, where informality amongst the youth is estimated at 71%, young people find
themselves more vulnerable to income and job losses in times of crises, including as a result
of the states’ responses to the coronavirus.4 Women workers were also hit the hardest by the
crisis, especially as large numbers of women continue to work in the informal sector, and
continue to earn less than men, on a global scale. As a result, women have experienced higher
rates of job losses than men, even in developed economies.5 The compounding effects of
gender, sector of employment, age, as well as country of employment draw a variegated map
of vulnerabilities and unequal effects of the pandemic on the areas of work and livelihood.
This paper examines the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on vulnerable employment in Egypt,
conducting an assessment of the government’s response to the pandemic and presenting
recommendations for policies to address the specific impact of the pandemic, as well as the
long-lasting structures of work vulnerability in Egypt.
The impacts of the COVID-19 crisis have been vast in Egypt, particularly in the areas of
work and incomes. The official unemployment rate has increased from 7.7% in the first quarter
of 2020 to 9.6% in the second quarter of the same year.6 This statistic eclipses the shrinking
of the labor force from 29 million in the first quarter, to 26.689 million in the second quarter,
a decrease by 8% that the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS)
justifies by the inability of millions to even search for jobs, rendering their response to the
unemployment survey question on whether they are actively searching for jobs an automatic
no. Clearly, such a decrease in the labor force is not an increase in the willingness to work, but
rather an increase in the ability to work, and thus, these populations should have been added
to those unemployed, as opposed to excluded from the workforce. If we were to add this
group of workers who were excluded from the labor force both back to the labor force, and to
the numbers of unemployed, the unemployment rate would reach 16.87% in the second half
3

“As jobs crisis deepens, ILO warns of uncertain and incomplete labour market recovery”. The International Labour Organization, 2020. <https://bit.ly/3oub6N6>.

4

“ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Fourth edition Updated estimates and analysis”. The International Labour Organization, 2020. <https://bit.ly/3tbIdsi>. P.7.

5

Ibid.,

CAPMAS. 2020. Press Release: Because of the coronavirus, unemployment rates increase to 9.6% in the second quarter. https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/
GeneralNews.aspx?page_id=1

6
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of the quarter, thus more than doubling from the first half.7 This is, of course, notwithstanding
the ongoing research critiquing the CAPMAS methodology of casting unemployment surveys
that challenge the pre-pandemic unemployment rates. In raw numbers, we are looking at
4.89 million Egyptians now newly unemployed in the second quarter of 2020. Needless to
say, women continue to be twice as much unemployed as men, although it seems that women
were more likely to be removed from the labor force estimates in the second quarter as well,
thus resulting in seemingly less disparity than usual in official unemployment rates. Finally,
it is worth pointing out in light of the vulnerabilities of youth worldwide, that youth in Egypt
(defined as those between 15 and 29) make up 60% on average of all unemployed.8
Here it is important to note the findings of the CAPMAS income and expenditure data
to show the significance of work and income to the survival of Egyptians. According to the
report, Egyptians living below the poverty line (sat at L.E 735.5 monthly) have increased 4.7%
(about 5 million individuals) between 2015-2018, raising the percentage of the poor to 32.5%
of the total population. In other words, more than one-third of the Egyptian population live
below the national poverty line, which is not sufficient to cover their basic needs, especially
after the liberalization of the currency (associated with economic reform) in 2016 and the
surging inflation that ensued. In addition, there are more than 6 million additional individuals
(about 6.2% of the total population) who live under the extreme poverty line (set at L.E 490.18
monthly). Finally, there are further 10% of the population who live on L.E 400 monthly or less.
In total, about 90% of Egyptians spend around L.E 1458 monthly. This reflects many variations
of vulnerabilities experiences by Egyptians, including the lack of sufficiently rewarding jobs
that can help citizens alleviate their living conditions and cover their basic needs. The
phenomenon of underemployment by which individuals have less work than they need to
survive continues, thus pointing to the lack of savings or means of survival, which resulted in
Egyptians having to resort to eating less or borrowing money once the pandemic hit.
A recent report by CAPMAS on Egyptian families found that 73.5% of survey respondents
reported a decrease to their incomes. The hardest hit were workers without university degrees:
87.3% of those workers reported income decrease, compared to only about half of workers
with university degrees.9 The report surveys Egyptian families’ coping mechanisms with the
coronavirus and the ensuing crisis, and finds that about 50% of households had had to resort
to credit to cover their monthly needs, 17% resorted to the help of charities, while only 5.4%
7

Researchers’ own calculations based on the CAPMAS estimates of labor force in the second quarter of 2020.

CAPMAS. 2020. Press Release: Because of the coronavirus, unemployment rates increase to 9.6% in the second quarter. https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/
GeneralNews.aspx?page_id=1
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9

CAPMAS. 2020. Impact of Coronavirus on Egyptian Families till May 2020. https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/GeneralNews.aspx?page_id=1
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had received the government grant to workers in the unregulated economy. In addition,
changes to consumption patterns to survive the coronavirus included Egyptian households
decreasing meat and poultry consumption by 25%, and decreased fruit consumption by
17.5%. According to the survey findings, one third of Egyptian families have reported their
income insufficient to fulfill their basic needs, as a result 36% of families have had to resort
to decreasing their meal sizes, 20% have had to decrease the number of meals, 14% have had
adults decrease their food intake to make food available for kids, 4.6% have had to leave the
family home and spend time with extended family to find access to food, while 2.8% have had
to spend periods of time without any food.
Despite the striking findings of official data, these numbers eclipse many sectoral,
gender and legal inequalities that result in the absence of entire hidden worlds of labor
from those statistics on employment and the labor force. In this policy research, we seek
to bring some of those hidden activities back to the forefront, as many of them are indeed
encompassing the most vulnerable and precarious of Egyptian workers. In other words, we
do not frame the problem of work as merely an issue of employment and unemployment but
seek to widen the scope to understand the problem along the lines of vulnerabilities. This new
approach addresses the problems of insufficient incomes, insecure jobs, underemployment
and irregular work, all of which coalesce to create vulnerability and precariousness in the
lives of Egyptians. In a country where informality dominates work relations, questioning the
structures of existing working conditions and employment security becomes imperative,
especially at times where secure access to a sustainable and adequate income are jeopardized.
In other words, investigating the continuing vulnerabilities through existing structures and
legal/policy frameworks alongside the specific crisis responses is imperative, in order to
arrive at both structural and direct response policy solutions for the post coronavirus era.
This research paper addresses policies pertaining to employment security10 on three
tiers: First, after mapping the areas of ‘vulnerable work’, including informal labor, labor in the
gig economy, self-employed and other types of precarious work, we explore the structural
changes needed in the fields of employment security and labor relations that would ensure
that workers in various sectors, particularly the most vulnerable, are protected by laws and
policies. Second, the research addresses the policy responses in times of crises, like COVID-19,
to the issues of unemployment, particularly in the most vulnerable sectors of work. In doing
so, we conduct an assessment of the existing responses, and how the responses could have
been done differently or better. Although some of those responses were in the right direction,
their shortcomings revealed much deeper structural obstacles within employment relations
10
Employment security refers to the protection of workers and their earned incomes against fluctuations in the economy and society, and can include protections
against dismissals and pay loss. For more information, refer to “ Employment security”. The International Labor Organization, n.d. <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/
employment-security/lang--en/index.htm>.
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and the government’s grasp of citizens’ security, and registry of the extent of vulnerabilities.
Finally, the research will attempt to provide concrete and grounded policy recommendations,
both on the short term in response to the crisis, as well as suggest longer term restructuring,
which we believe is necessary to address the current vulnerability and precariousness of the
world of labor and employment in Egypt.

Notes on methodology
The research is partly based on analyzing data preceding the pandemic in Egypt, and
particularly CAPMAS reports that survey the impacts of COVID-19 on labor relations and on
families. Although the data is still scarce, the available resources draw an image that allows
us to assess both the policies undertaken and their impacts on various groups of workers and
labor in Egypt. In addition, we have conducted several interviews with experts in the field of
labor rights and labor law in Egypt, asking for their expertise on specific sectors of female
employment, agricultural workers, domestic workers, informal and construction workers. We
have benefited a lot from their grassroots insights on how workers were (and continue to be)
affected during the pandemic, how they perceived the EGP 500 grant, and what they faced in
their respective sectors of labor. In particular, we are very thankful to our friends at Center for
Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA) and Egyptian Association for Collective Rights
(EACR) for sharing with us unpublished reports and works in progress related to farmers,
domestic workers and female labor during the pandemic. Finally, we reviewed literature and
laws pertaining to labor rights in Egypt and tried to draw the ways that structural insecurities
in the labor market have been exacerbated by the pandemic.
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Part 2. Mapping Vulnerabilities and Precariousness in the
Egyptian Labor Market
Egypt’s labor market is large, messy and has many invisible sectors and populations. The
acute presence of an informal economy has meant that a majority of the economy, economic
activities and structures fall outside the scope of registration. It is important here to note that
this policy research will not focus narrowly on the so-called informal economy but will rather
pay attention to mapping vulnerabilities in the world of work. Not only is the binary formalinformal very narrow and misleading, especially in its combination of unrelated activities such
domestic labor and drug activities, but it also assumes a clear division between formality and
informality, when in fact a large segment of the economy falls in-between. Suffice to say
that with the proliferation of labor/ ‘manpower’ supply companies many large corporations
in Egypt and worldwide have outsourced their labor relations to third parties and are thus
often reliant on informal workers and non-contractual work relations. The spread of labor
supply companies in Egypt has reportedly reached both craftsmanship, blue-collar work, as
well as white collar activities.11 This, in turn, has endangered work relationships, and denied
workers hired through these labor supply companies from basic protections, including basic
protections provided by the Egyptian Labor Code. This also results in a feature of uncertainty
that one of our experts dubbed “the revolving workers”, where workers are moved by their
supply company from one job to the next, sometimes multiple times a year, which results in
workers’ inability to build any relationships, demand rights and protections, or even better
their skills and advance their careers. This is notwithstanding the fact that workers forego
a percentage of their pay and are usually underpaid in comparison to their counterparts
who are directly hired through contracts by the same companies.12 The existence of such
companies is an ongoing structure that muddies the field of work, and makes precariousness
even more salient and widespread across various groups of Egyptian workers in various
sectors. More research is needed to quantify the impact of these supplying companies, and
more regulation is a must to ensure that the Egyptian labor code is not being emptied of its
content by such shadow structures and labor relations. This example, however, speaks to
the futility of thinking of the labor market, and workers in Egypt, in terms of formal versus
informal, and instead highlights the need to focus on the vulnerabilities in labor relations and
in labor activities, in an attempt to map the various sectors that are often invisible, ignored or
eclipsed by existing laws and policies.
A final note before we delve into the mapping of vulnerable Egyptian workers concerns
For those unfamiliar with the concept or operations of such labor supply companies, we present an example of a supply company in Egypt for your review. Note the
variety of jobs and laborers offered through this website. https://alrawan-eg.com/worker/en/
11

12

Interview conducted by researchers with a Labor expert in Egypt via phone, July 2020.
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the subjective experiences of vulnerability or precarity. As one social scientist once famously
noted, “we are all precarious”.13 Neoliberalism produces vulnerabilities and precarity on a
structural level: the so-called flexibilization of work relations, de-regularization of industries
and shrinkage of state roles result in uncertain jobs, anxious presents and intangible futures
for everyone. In other words, when we highlight the most vulnerable in this research, we are
not trying to say that others are not precarious, are not vulnerable. Instead, we are trying to
highlight the worst livelihoods, the most uncertain, those most likely to not survive crises
such as the coronavirus. In our research, the public sector and governmental employees are
an excellent example to this. Those public employees suffer from low salaries, from worsening
work conditions and from structures such as the Civil Service Code, which renders them
vulnerable and insecure. They remain, however, much better off than their counterparts in the
private sector, in terms of their job security, pay security, association rights (however limited)
and work conditions, including working hours. According to a recent study conducted by the
Economic Research Forum, 93% of those employed by the public sector (and hold a secondary
school degree or higher) enjoy social insurance coverage versus only 34% in the private
sector. Likewise, 94% of those employed by the public sector enjoy paid vacations compared
to just 47% in the private sector.14 Even in terms of wages/ salaries, CAPMAS estimates that,
on average, those employed in the public sector receive L.E 1278 per week in comparison to
L.E 877 in the private sector.15 Of course, government employees are vulnerable bodies, and
many of them lead very precarious, uncertain and insecure lives. But they are not the worst
in the Egyptian labor market, and still enjoy a lot of structural protections and benefits, we
therefore do not look into them in our mapping effort.

A macro-mapping of labor in Egypt
As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of 2020 Egypt had a labor force of 29 million
persons ready for work, whether they currently work or not. This number supposedly includes
everyone who is willing to work, whether they work or not, and whether they work for a wage
or not, work for an employer or are self-employed. This number does not include “dedicated
housewives’’, full time students, and those unwilling to work.16 While this official number is
lacking in many respects, some of which we will deal with in this paper, we will follow its trails
to understand what occupations those workers are in, what sectors do they occupy, and how
Seymour R (2012) We are all precarious – On the concept of the “precariat” and its misuses. New Left Project, 10 February. Available (accessed 24 September 2015) at:
http://tinyurl.com/85s9rtz

13

14
“ Hal al-iqtisad al masry yakhleq foras a’amalh gayidah? Lays ba’ad”.-Does the Egyptian economy generate good working opportunities? Not yet-. Economy Plus, 2019.
<https://bit.ly/3ozBWmO>.

Doubtless, these averages should be treated carefully as it does not take into account the discrepancies caused by the different occupational ranking and their effects
on the overall average. See “al-Taqreer al tahlily lil-nashara al-sanaweya l-ihsaat al-twazf wa al-egor wa saat al-’amal ‘aam 2018”- The annual report for labour, wages, and
working hours statistics in 2018-. CAPMAS, 2019. <https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=5104&YearID=23462>.

15

16

CAPMAS. 2020. Bulletin of Labor Force (January-March 2020), p. 17. https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=5106&YearID=23538
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they are gendered.
Of those employed in the first quarter of 2020 (figures 1 and 2), 71% worked for a
wage (66.5% of employed women in the statistic), 9.8% were self-employed and employed
others (2.2% only of employed women in the statistic), 13.2% were self-employed without
employing others (8.6% of employed women in the statistic) and 6% were family employed
without a salary (22.6% of employed women in the statistic.) The key occupations17 (figures
3 and 4) that these workers are in are important to highlight here: 19.8% of those employed
are craft workers (only 1.9% of employed women in the statistic); 18% of those employed in
the first quarter of 2020 work in service jobs, including restaurant and shop workers (17.5%
of employed women in the statistic); 13.7% of those employed are agricultural workers and
fisherman (21.9% of employed women in the statistic); 12.2% of the total are factory workers
and machine operators (4.6% of employed women in the statistic); 11.2% are technicians and
clerks (19.5% of employed women in the statistic) and finally 11.7% are the professionals (27.6%
of employed women in the statistic). Finally, it is important to shed light on what sectors
these workers are employed in (figures 5 and 6). Here again, we only highlight the key sectors
of employment relevant to this study and their gendered nature: 19.4% of all workers find
themselves in the agricultural and fishing sector (22.6% for women); 14.4% are in the wholesale
and retail trade sector (14.1% for women); a critical 13.6% find themselves in the construction
sector (0.4% for women); while a similar 13.4% are employed in the manufacturing sector
(7.7% for women). Finally, employed women in the statistic are visibly present in the health
and the education sectors, where 12.6% and 24.1% of women work respectively (compared to
a percentage of 3.4% and 7.5% to the total of all employed).18

Figure 1

17

This is not an exhaustive list of all occupations, but rather the most important ones for this research. For a full list, please review CAPMAS (footnote 14), p. 45

18

CAPMAS. 2020. Bulletin of Labor Force (January-March 2020). p. 49 pp. https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=5106&YearID=23538
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Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4
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Figure 5

Figure 6
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Lastly for the macro-mapping based on CAPMAS data, public sector and governmental
employees make up almost 20% of all employed persons in the labor force, while registered
private sectors employees make up 35.6% to the total of employment, and private sector
employment outside establishments (below the registration requirements) make up 43.5% of
all employment. Based on these numbers, it would be fair to assume that the most vulnerable
workers are easily falling within the private sector (within and outside establishments), as
well as those who are not captured by this statistic, and are not considered in the labor force
for a variety of reasons, despite their willingness to work, and their actual undertaking of
work. In other words, 80% of Egyptians employed and captured by the statistic are already
vulnerable to the fluctuations of the market, are self-employed or employed with lacking
protections, including non-contractually employed. One of the ways this is evident is through
the continuity of work: while private sector workers outside establishments make up only
43.5% of all workers in the official CAPMAS statistic, they make up 95% of all casual work
in Egypt. Similarly, while private sector work (inside establishments) makes up 35.6% of all
employment, it is responsible for 81% of all temporary work in the country. In a similar vein,
while 94.1% of all public employees have a work contract, only 30.9% of private sector workers
in registered establishments have similar contracts.19 This, of course, is not notwithstanding
those who are not captured by these statistics. In the following, we delve into some details
for some of those vulnerable sections of society.

First, Farmers and the agricultural workers
Agricultural workers captured by the CAPMAS statistic are the agricultural workers who
do not own or rent land, cattle or plants. Anyone in the agricultural sector, who owns, or rents
land, and/or cattle and/or plants is a farmer and falls outside of the labor force estimates.
This distinction is so critical, because it can potentially double the numbers of people in the
agricultural sector from the original number captured by the CAPMAS statistic for agricultural
workers, which would come to almost 5.8 million workers. It is also critical when considering
that most of these farmers are small sharecroppers and include a number of farmers who are
tenants, not owners, of land. In fact, the last Economic Census of Egypt from 2017/2018 reveals
that out of a total 134,335 agricultural producers/ establishments in Egypt, 115,243 hire less
than one person on the land, while 16,144 establishments hire less than 5 persons.20
The latest estimates from the Agricultural census from 2010 show that there are a total of
5.4 million farmers in Egypt, almost 1 million of them do not own land, but own other agricultural

19

Ibid.,

20

CAPMAS. 2018. Final Results of Economic Census 2017/2018. p. 79 https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Economicnew.aspx?page_id=2029
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assets, including oxen, buffalos and other cattle. In addition, 2.143 million farmers own less than
1 feddan of land, and 1.068 million farmers own just about 1 feddan, while another half a million
own less than 2 feddans.21 In other words, about 18% of farmers are not landowners, but are
also not counted as laborers, because as farmers they own agricultural assets (mostly buffalos)
and are registered with the agricultural cooperatives. Another 10% of farmers are renting the
land, so they do not actually have any ownership over it. While 40% own small lands that do not
come close to 1 feddan. According to agricultural experts we talked to, these farmers are poor,
and have very insecure work conditions, particularly in the absence of any insurance against
natural disasters. For example, as major flooding hit Egypt in the early weeks of the pandemic in
March of 2020, many farmers lost their crops from the November cycle, and thus lost a quarter
of their annual income, at least, without any paths for compensation. Then, as the coronavirus
paralyzed transport and market, it forced farmers to sell their crops on the ground, selling for
losses, and without hope of negotiating prices.22 This precarious state of being brings to light
the importance of noting other forms of economic activity that are not counted towards the
labor force, but that affect the work-life nexus of Egyptian families, and in this case, affects
close to 5 million families, farmer families, who were not eligible for any compensations after
the flooding, and had no access to any government grants or assistance during the pandemic.

Second, Women workers
Only 16.4% of all women are in the labor force, according to CAPMAS.23 55.2% supposedly
are exclusively housewives, and therefore fall outside of the labor force, while another 18%
are full time students. The underrepresentation of women in the labor force can be traced
back to many variables, but certainly none of them is related to women’s lack of work, or
willingness to work. Notwithstanding the fact that women’s work at home is labor, and is very
valuable labor that is central to the reproduction of the labor force in Egypt, women in Egypt
like women globally, undertake multiple burdens of working in the house and outside the
house, but their labor is undercounted, undervalued, underpaid and often rendered invisible.
A labor law expert we talked to explained how women are often assumed to be willingly and
exclusively housewives, and thus excluded from the unemployment survey, although many of
them are willing to, actively seeking to, and often recently engaged in work. Still, we find that
only a total of 5.28 million women have made it to the labor force, and only 4.12 million of them

21

CAPMAS. 2019. Statistical Yearbook. Agriculture and Land Reclamation (Fifth book, paperback only).

22

Interview conducted by researchers with an agricultural expert, July 2020.

23

CAPMAS. 2020. Bulletin of Labor Force (January-March 2020). https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=5106&YearID=23538
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were employed in the first quarter of 2020. In addition to the small and unrealistic number of
working women in the CAPMAS surveys, we also find that about 22% of these women work for
no wages, and a similar number, largely overlapping with it, work as agricultural workers. This
22% would only make up slightly more than 1 million women in the agricultural sector, although
another CAPMAS publication, the agricultural census, puts this number at 4,6 million female
agricultural workers, mostly casual workers.24 More pressingly, these women are unregulated
workers, precisely because the labor law number 12/2003 excludes many female agricultural
workers from any legal protections, particularly if they work for no wage and/ or work for their
family lands. Article 1 defines the worker as someone who works for a wage, in cash or in kind,
which many agricultural workers do not do; and in addition, article 4 of the Labor Code 12/2003
precisely excludes “domestic workers and those with similar work” and “the family members of
the employer”. Why the labor code decides to so clearly exclude female domestic workers, and
potentially millions of female agricultural laborers is a critical question, but what is clear is that
as a result, these women workers are unrecognized, unregulated and unprotected. Without
recourse to labor organizations, and no recourse to legal acknowledgements, these women
are the most prone to abuse, insecurities and vulnerability in times of crises. To clarify this
vulnerability further, the World Bank assesses female vulnerable employment at 32.93% of total
female employment in Egypt in 2019.25 Even in terms of wage gap, recent studies estimated it
at 22-25%.26 As such, it is not strange to find that in 2016 only 6.3% of firms in Egypt had female
top managers.27 By the same token, female unemployment among educated females remains
very high (about 25%). In more general terms, female employees/workers face different types
of harassment and discrimination that prohibit them from participating actively in the labor
market.28 This is despite the fact that the most conservative estimates show that 14% of families
in Egypt (approximately 3.3 million families) are headed and financially supported by females29,
while other estimates set this number at 30% of all households being headed by females30.
Eclipsing women’s labor and economic activities in CAPMAS statistics comes at a high
cost, when women’s contributions and struggles for work are missed, and as a result, they are
missing from the government’s plan to address the impact of the coronavirus. In other words,
women’s contribution to the survival of Egyptian households, and the share they contribute
to household incomes should be guiding the government’s response to the pandemic, and
considering how to ensure these women’s ongoing employment, incomes flow as well as
25
World Bank 2020. “Vulnerable employment, female (% of female employment) (modeled ILO estimate) - Egypt, Arab Rep.”. World Bank, 2020. https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/SL.EMP.VULN.FE.ZS?locations=EG
26
Mentioned in Yassmine Samra. “Egypt’s GDP could jump 32% by achieving gender equality: IFC”. Egypt Today, 2018. <https://bit.ly/3httKBY>. Earlier estimates put the
gender wage gap at 25%. See Amal Khairy Amin Mahmoud. “An Analysis of the Gender Pay Gap in the Egyptian Labour Market”. IARIW-CAPMAS Special Conference, 2015. P. 5
27

See for example, “Gender”. Word Bank, n.d. <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/data/exploretopics/gender>.
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Ali al-Raggal. “Informal Economy in Egypt: A Problem of Governance or an Economic Crisis?”. Assafir Al-Arabi, 2019. https://bit.ly/2VS63L8
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Hend el-Behary. 2018. “14 percent of Egyptian families depend on female breadwinners: CAPMAS”. Egypt Independent. https://bit.ly/2EfYAzN
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protection in times of crises from dismissals and pay cuts. A grassroots study conducted by
CEWLA, based on in-depth interviews with over 120 women of various backgrounds, is a case in
point. According to the CEWLA study, only 51% of the women they talked to applied to the grant
for unregulated workers. Of those who applied, only 8% got the grant. What we found critical
though, is that tens of women did not apply because they did not think that they, as women,
were eligible. When the ministry of labor launched a website to explain the jobs that were
eligible for applications, they listed all jobs directed at males, including plumber, construction
worker, security person, painter and welder.31 The gendered nature of the call for grants has
had serious consequences in women thinking those were male jobs, a fatal mistake that led a
large percent of the sample in this study not to apply to the grant. The CEWLA study sheds light
on the real effects of the pandemic on women, and the precarious nature of women’s work and
lives: Not only did 59% of the women in the sample lose their jobs due to the coronavirus, and
not only did all women report a loss of income even when they did not lose their jobs, but women
also had to shoulder unequal burdens of caring for children, who are now not going to school,
cooking extra meals for a family that is now spending 24-7 at home, dealing with increasing
rates of domestic violence and abuse, not just directed at them, but also at their children, and
dealing with price hikes and important choices about how to make ends meet, and how to put
food on the table. 76% of the women in the sample reported the increased burdens on them
due to the constant presence of males in the household, and their unwillingness to help out
with housework.32 Finally, 63% of women in the sample reported domestic violence incidents by
males in their households during the lockdown; 75% of all cases of violence were perpetrated
by the spouse, while 11% was perpetrated by a brother (64) Perhaps more alarmingly, 42% of
women who are now facing domestic violence during the lockdown reported that they had
never before experienced any domestic violence, thus making the lockdown the beginning of
abuse in their households.

Third, Workers in the irregular economy
As mentioned before, it can be very misleading to follow the trails of informality in Egypt,
equating it exclusively with vulnerability. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid a discussion of the
informal economy, estimated at 40% of the economy33, particular as the major coronavirus
response by the Egyptian government pertained to it. Even though there are millions of noncontractual laborers, millions of informal agricultural workers, and a large estimate of women
agricultural workers and domestic workers, the main estimate used for the unregulated economy
is the CAPMAS estimate for workers in the private sector working outside establishments.

31

Gamal, Sherif. May 18, 2020. “Stories of Women in the Pandemic Days.” P. 39. Center for Egyptian Women Legal Aid. [Arabic Only]
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economy-. al-Maal, 2019.<https://bit.ly/2Mg7jTC>.
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It is unclear why the ministry of labor, in its registry of irregular workers, only pays
attention to specific jobs, while completely ignore agricultural workers, who are often excluded
from statistics and reports on informal workers. Moreover, the lack of data and registry of
those irregular workers is disturbing, particularly considering how quickly the government
got 1.5 million workers to apply and register themselves once the opportunity was available
for a grant. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Labor, the ministry only has a registry
of 120,000 irregular workers, despite the fact that CAPMAS estimates more than 10 million
irregular workers.34 This brings us to who falls within the definition and count of irregular labor.
We already mentioned above that the agricultural workers are almost always excluded from this
count, which skews the numbers of irregular labor, and excludes millions of irregular workers
from basic protections, as well as from being eligible for grants such as the EGP 500 coronavirus
grant, which according to our expert interviews, was not received by any agricultural worker. But
other sectors seem to be equally misrepresented and vastly undercounted, especially the very
critical sector of construction. According to the head of construction and building contractors’
federation, there are about 10 million seasonal or temporary workers in the sector (working
in 35000 public and private companies). The federation head identified irregular workers as
those working without contracts and who do not belong to the labor force of a certain company
(they keep moving from one to another), some of whom are independent workers, and some
are employed through labor supply companies. These 10 million are very distinctive, because
even though 48% of irregular workers work in the construction sector, this still only amounts
to 13% of total employment, thus setting the number of construction workers at around 3.77
million only. Where are the remaining 7 million construction workers that the federation insists
exist? This, again, alludes to the importance of looking for the different modes of work that
are encompassed within the arena of casual and precarious employment. Only an in-depth
examination of these work patterns and the vulnerabilities they produce can be a foundation to
targeted policies and intervention towards ensuring employment security.
Finally, looking at what seem to be the most prominent forms of irregular labor we
encounter in everyday lives; one can only wonder where the female fruit and vegetable sellers
are accounted for? The thousands of food sellers, book sellers, accessory, scarves, shoes
and clothing sellers we each encountered on the streets, do they only account for 4.7% of all
employment in Egypt?35 Does it make sense that women only account for 3-4% of the informal
economy? Where are all the female domestic workers? The same shortcomings we encountered
in the call for the EGP 500 grant, is met in the government’s surveying and reporting of irregular
labor, where irregular jobs are listed as “street vendors, car parkers, car cleaners, bag carriers,
garbage collector, oiling worker”, all expressed in male nouns, with the exception of “babysitter
34
Ismail, Omaima. 2020. Facing both poverty and the virus, informal workers keep working and losing work. Mada Masr. https://www.madamasr.com/en/2020/04/21/
feature/economy/facing-both-poverty-and-the-virus-informal-workers-keep-working-and-losing-work/
35

CAPMAS. 2020d. Impact of Coronavirus on Egyptian Families till May 2020. p. 45 https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/GeneralNews.aspx?page_id=1

18

Employment Security in Egypt in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Rethinking Policies and
Practices
The Pandemic and Post-Pandemic Research and Innovation Initiative at the American University in Cairo

and elderly nurse”.36
Despite lack of data on these sectors, it seems necessary to mention that workers in
military or civil establishments during their military drafts/ service are not considered part of
the labor force, even though many of them end up working in military hospitals, factories and
establishments.37 Similarly, the labor of prison populations is not counted in the labor force38,
despite mounting evidence that prison labor is increasing in its importance for specific sectors.39

Part 3. Assessments of COVID-19 Policy Interventions
With the outbreak of the coronavirus, the Egyptian government has taken steps
to contain the spread of the virus, as well as alleviate its negative impacts, particularly on
vulnerable groups. Such steps included the allocation of a L.E 100 billion financial incentive
package to fund the state’s plan to contain the pandemic and its aftermath.40 Until May 2020,
L.E 63 billion from the package had been spent on covering some of what were perceived as
urgent matters such as providing incentives to the productive sectors; tax incentives; social
support (protection) and supporting the health sector among other things.41 However, these
steps did not necessarily fully benefit vulnerable groups nor managed to present a systematic
way of identifying and protecting those most vulnerable to the effects of the coronavirus in
society. Indeed, these stimuli carried a bias towards serving the interest of capital and helping
big companies navigate the ramifications of the crisis. As such, the vast majority of those
severely affected were excluded from the support extended by the government, including the
support that was targeted at the poor. In fact, in some cases, these steps or decisions taken
to mitigate the pressure of the pandemic on vulnerable groups were too limited to actually
compensate for the damages caused as will be shown in this section. Thus, although of those
decisions and steps taken seemed to be in the right direction, their shortcomings revealed
much deeper structural obstacles within employment relations and the government’s grasp of
citizens’ security, and registry of the extent of vulnerabilities.
After surveying different initiatives taken in light of the pandemic, we have chosen a
number of decisions that relate directly to the field of employment and employment security.
Common among these decisions is their inability to fully overcome the disastrous hardships
36
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imposed by the pandemic, which again goes back to the explicit limits within the overall
structures governing the realm of employment in Egypt. In other words, these response initiatives
have to be understood within the wider context of structural issues within the Egyptian labor
market, as the latter can explain both their successes and failures. Therefore, none of these
initiatives has the ability to genuinely lift those affected from the catastrophic consequences
of the pandemic or even to enforce a higher standard of social protection on the long term.
This is the case because these quick-fix measures did not seek to ensure structural securities
to Egyptian workers, but rather sought to give a shorthanded attempt at dealing with a crisis
that exacerbated the anxieties of every Egyptian household. Thus, we have to keep an eye on
the economic structures that these measures hit, in order to assess if addressing them could
actually help minimize/ eliminate the effects of the pandemic, and how to better their reach
and effectiveness.
In the following we start with perhaps one of the most important coronavirus interventions
that received much attention nationwide: the irregular workers’ fund.

First, On the irregular workers’ fund
In April, the Ministry of Labor and Manpower announced that funds had been allocated
to grant irregular workers a monthly grant of L.E 500 each for a period of three months as part
of the procedures to combat the effects of the spread of the pandemic.42 However, certain
eligibility stipulations were put for workers to receive the grant. These included primarily
registering online for the grant (through the form available online via a website created by the
ministry); to have lost a job after the spread of pandemic and not prior to it; and finally not to be
a recipient of other benefits from the state.43 In contrast to what some might think, the state’s
budget did not incur any cost related to the grant.44 Instead, the grant was completely funded
by the irregular workers’ fund, established in 2011 and containing a capital that ranges between
L.E 3.5 billion-L.E 4.5 billion.45 These amounts were collected from construction and quarries
companies in the form of a specific fee (0.0045%) from the total value of any project’s total
value.46 However, according to the former Minister of Manpower, companies in the agricultural
sector are not obliged to pay such a fee because of their dependence on temporary workers.47
Similarly, companies in the tourism sector did not contribute to the fund.48
Mohamed Hamid. “Amwalhom rodt elihem: man yadfa’a menht al-500 ganesh
lil-a’amalh gheer al-montazemah?” Their money returned to them: who pays for the
irregular labour’s L.E 500 grant?-. al-Manasa, 2020. <https://bit.ly/36pwGMB>. .
43
See the bulletin: beginning the disbursement of the irregular workers’ grant-.
Madamasr, 2020. <https://bit.ly/2ErpBQm>. .
42

The irregular workers’ fund was never mentioned in the budget under title or
form. However, according to an official in the ministry of finance interviewed by
the author, there are funds and reserves in the ministry of manpower to finance the
grant. Yet, in case of needing additional support, the ministry of finance can provide
it. Another official stated that there are 27 different bank accounts under the name
of ‘irregular workers’ which follow the manpower directorates in the provinces. Yet,
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these accounts were never collected together into a single account to unify the
rules of spending the money within. Hamid. “ Amwalhom rodt elihem…”., 2020.
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Ibid.
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47
Ibid.
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Most of the tourism companies depend on irregular workers or casual workers
without contracts, with estimates suggesting that they represent 45% of all workers
in the sector. This can be linked to the fact that of 19000 touristic bazaars in Egypt,
only 2076 are registered. Ibid.
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Overall, a number of discrepancies surround the fund and the grant. To begin with, from
2011 to 2014, the fund’s money was not targeting irregular workers as planned, with 70% of the
money going to the employees in the Labor Ministry directorates and the remaining 30% going
to irregular workers.49 Only from 2015 onwards was this trend reserved, with more money going
to irregular workers.50 This presents both a model for financing support and grants to irregular
labor, but also a wake-up call to the importance of having such funds set aside, and indeed set
aside and earmarked exclusively for the irregular labor force, not for all workers.
The second consideration related to the grant has to do with the eligibility and
beneficiaries. Originally, the Ministry of Labor stated that 2.5 million individuals registered for
the grant. However, in August, the government announced that the final number of workers
to receive the grant are 1.6 million workers.51 Here one has to recall that the Minister of Labor
announced in April 2020 that 1.4 million irregular workers will start to receive the grant.52
Similarly, in June, the Minister of Planning announced that about 4.4 million individuals applied
for the grant. However, after reviewing their applications, it was decided that only 1.9 million of
them are eligible and deserve the grant.53 The confusion about the actual number of recipients
does not stop here. In the report conducted in collaboration between the Ministry of Finance
and UNICEF cited above, it was reported that the total cost of the grant was L.E 3 billion.54
So, by dividing the total cost of L.E 3 billion by the total of L.E 1500 to be received by each
worker over the period of 3 months, the number of recipients will be 2 million individuals, as in
400,000 additional workers in addition to the 1.6 million announced in the latest governmental
announcement. In light of this, it is not clear which number of these is the most accurate,
especially that the criteria of eligibility remain largely vague and far from being specific. The
lack of transparency and information provided to the public about the criteria of eligibility was
a critical barrier that created a lot of confusion.55 Only once did the Minister of Labor reveal
specific criteria in April when he justified the exclusion of 500,000 individuals from the grant
due to owning agricultural lands/estates (read: farmers or small land owners) or for registering
in the names of children or deceased individuals.56 Behind all of this confusion lies a group of
bigger problems all related to the nature of the grant.
First, while targeting irregular workers, all the potential numbers mentioned above,
50
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including final numbers of recipients, fall short from being a fair or accurate representation of the
actual numbers of irregular workers currently in Egypt. In fact, varying estimates are available.
To begin with, there is the cited figure of 10 million irregularly mentioned by the Minister of
Manpower.57 Abu Eita, the former Minister of Manpower, estimates that the actual number of
irregular workers in Egypt reaches up to 15 or 20 million and that there are no census on this
category as the latter hide out in fear of any attention that might draw some governmental
procedures with a negative impact on their income.58 There is also the International Labor
Organization’s estimates which put the informal workers in Egypt at about 63% of an estimated
employed population of 30 million.59 As mentioned above, this discrepancy in numbers is not
coincidental but it can be attributed to the lack of an updated database of irregular workers in
Egypt.60 The absence of such a database cannot be perceived except as a structural obstacle in
the road of alleviating the standards of living.61 Afterall, the governmental reluctance to extend
the registration deadline beyond the original two weeks period62 shows conservatism on the
government’s part to recognize one of the vital problems within the broader vision upon which
the grant was constructed: outreach and making irregular workers finally legible.
Secondly, registering for the grant was not as straightforward as the official media
claimed. For instance, accessing the website was not always an easy option for all those trying
to register. The high number of visitors attempting to register generated a high pressure on
the Ministry’s website, which ended up affecting its functionality and complicated accessing
the registration forms.63 Similarly, not all those attempting to register had the knowledge or the
experience of dealing with the internet or computer. Therefore, they resorted to middlemen
(i.e., internet cafes or stationary shops) to help them complete the registration process.64 As
a matter of fact, some testimonies show that some of these middlemen used to ask for a fee
that goes up L.E 100 in exchange of assisting in the registration process while other kept the
national identification cards (IDs) of those applying to force them to split the grant when, if,
they receive it.65
Adding to the above, there is the problem of unexplained de facto exclusions. As already
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mentioned, the criteria of the grant’s eligibility is extremely vague.66 Yet, it is hard to comprehend
why certain categories of irregular workers such as street vendors; shoe wipers and workers
not covered by any sort of insurance at both formal and informal institutions were dismissed
at the time when others categorized as housewives received the grant.67 Here, one has to take
note of the structurally gender-related problems, reflected in the grant’s distribution process,
before assuming that it was genderly just. For example, in Aswan, a survey conducted by the
directorate of manpower showed that 1/3 of irregular workers are females. However, none of
them received the grant.68
Finally, there is the problem of the grant’s amount. It is evident that any additional amount of
money in a time of crisis would be welcome. However, L.E 500 is such a small amount that it
would not have been sufficient to cover even the basic necessities for a few days before the
pandemic, let alone during its peak. As one irregular worker sums it up, “Even if I registered
and received [the money], how long would it last -- a few days?”69. This is so, even by the official
standards, which set the poverty line at L.E 735.5 monthly. In other words, the grant, which
amounts over 3 months to a total of L.E 1500, can barely cover a household basic needs for two
months and thus it cannot be a dependable and sufficient source of income during the crisis.70
In short, even though the grant was an important intervention, it has fallen short on many fronts
in helping vulnerable groups in dealing with the effects of the pandemic, and we fear that it
would have caused more confusion and anxiety for those in need.

Second, financing the crisis
The Egyptian government has been looking for additional sources of funding the crisis, given
its annual huge monetary deficit caused by its accumulated internal and external debts. As
such, the government applied for a new loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
already in June 2020, amounting to $ 5.2 billions.71 Though the loan was approved72, it was
not enough to cover the growing needs resulting from the pandemic. As a result, efforts have
been directed towards finding internal solutions to help financing those needs. After a long
period of anticipation, the Egyptian parliament approved the enactment of a new law to cover
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the lack of funding problem by monthly deductions from all formal workers and employees
nationwide.73 The Law (170) for the year 2020 stipulated monthly dedication of 1% from the
net income of employees in all governmental and official institutions as well as 0.5% from the
net pensions monthly received has been approved for 12 months, starting August 2020, to
help mitigating the economic ramifications of pandemics and natural disasters.74 Only those
with salaries or pensions below L.E 2000 (the official minimum wage) are excluded from these
monthly deductions.75 It is worth noting that the law was approved after another legislation was
discussed in May and eventually casted away, according to which obligatory donations from all
companies and economic activities were to be enforced.76 The question here is why the choice
was to place the burden of financing the crisis on the shoulders of workers, who are already
bearing the brunt of the pandemic? Why is the government unable to exert any pressure on
wealthy individuals and profiting corporations solve the funding gap, without asking workers
with disparate living conditions to fund the crisis?

Part 4. Policy Recommendations for Employment Security
While the COVID-19 crisis hit the entire world economy, it still presented policy makers
everywhere with the opportunity to rethink, reform and re-envision the structures of their
economies, including the structures of labor relations. Because employment security and
the right to work are important structures of security and social welfare, policies targeting
employment security cannot merely be crisis-based, or short-term responses to crisis situations
similar to COVID-19. Precariousness and vulnerability are everyday realities that are experienced
regardless of the crisis but are exacerbated and deepened by the crisis. In this vein, public
policies should target short term interventions to quickly fix, or avert the consequences of the
pandemic, in addition to medium and long-term interventions that ensure that the structures
of vulnerability are targeted, and precarious workers have better protections, visibility,
associational power, and recognitions.
The law project was first discussed in the Parliament in April and took about 4 months to be approved. See Yasmine Fawaz. “Khasm nesbah min al-rateb...tashreea’a
mortaqb fil-barlman li-da’am al-dawla fi harbha dod al-korona”- Deducting a percentage from the salary...an expected legislation in the parliament to aid the state in its
fight against the corona-. al-Maal, 2020.< https://bit.ly/3gpn7iB>; and “iqteta’a 1% min rwateb al-a’amleen bi-masr li-mowaght corona”.- The deduction of 1% of the salaries
of workers in Egypt to confront Corona-. al-arabi al-gadeed, 2020. <https://bit.ly/2L2neHt>.
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Finally, precariousness and vulnerability are embodied in the relationality between life
and work, between the past and the future, and between the individual and the state. That being
said, our recommendations in this section target the precariousness of work life, the security of
work relations, and the empowerment of workers to have access to decent work, living wages,
and employment security. This is particularly important in times of crises, when precariousness
is a general condition of life, but is unevenly distributed amongst people with less secure jobs
and incomes. But we are aware that other social protections, access to quality social security
schemes, quality universal healthcare and equitable recourse to justice are equally necessary to
tackle the vulnerabilities and precarity of human life. Hopefully the collection of policy papers
in this volume will comprehensively draw this combined scheme of protecting the vulnerable
in our societies, in times of crises and beyond.

1. CRISIS-LEVEL INTERVENTIONS
I. Work-sharing programs
The onset of the COVID-19 crisis negatively impacted the daily business cycle, leading
to a decline in some firms and corporations’ revenues and profits, affecting their chances
of survival. To mitigate such ramifications, or preempt them, many employers resorted to
laying off some or most of their workers to compensate for lost revenues. Recognizing the
dangers of such a step, however, certain countries interfered directly to prevent such dangers
from unfolding through implementing work-sharing programs. Work-sharing programs are a
government subsidization of employers’ payrolls in exchange for reduced working hours per
employee. In other words, instead of laying off workers/ employees, all workers/ employees
within any given company agree to share their tasks and work less number of hours for the
duration of the crisis.77 In exchange, the government offers to cover in part the resulting gaps
in their paychecks by entering into agreements with their employers. This type of programs
has proven successful in Germany for instance, where about 10 million individuals managed
to keep their jobs and receive up to 87% of their original salary/wage during 2020 and despite
the COVID-19 crisis.78 The creation of a similar program in Egypt would ensure the readiness of
both government officials and employers to deal with the repercussions of crises, prioritizing
their workers, especially the most vulnerable, while ensuring the survival and flourishing of
their economic enterprises.

II. Conditional business stimuli
Similar to the work-sharing programs, is the idea of conditional business stimuli. For
example, in Egypt stimuli packages were offered to the firms working within the tourism sector
77
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in exchange for keeping their entire labor force and stopping any laying off resulting from the
crisis. Accordingly, the latter firms were permitted to apply for loans to cover the basic wages/
salaries of their workers and employees.79 Moreover, it was agreed that all property tax on such
firms were to be dropped for 6 months in addition to postponing (or paying in instalments) any
previously owed amounts for 3 months without any charges.80 However, several questions all
related to problems of transparency and lack of clarity are in order here. First, as it was the case
with the L.E 500 grant, vagueness surrounds the actual amount to be received by workers in
the tourism sector. While some officials declared that such workers were to receive their full
monthly wage/salary, others stated that workers will only receive the insurance wage (the wage
for which employers pay a monthly insurance).81 This possibly means, especially with the lack
of a clear eligibility criteria, that only insured workers will receive their wages in a sector where
at least 26% work on an irregular or seasonal basis.82 Another question is the one concerning
monitoring the firms’ abidance to the earlier mentioned stipulations. Indeed, the government
took away the license of one hotel for not abiding to its regulations.83 Still, because firms were
still in the process of listing the names and number of their employees while applying to be
considered for the package, room exists for manipulation or inaccurate reporting. Hence, this
problem does not only reveal pre-existing structural weaknesses, as such lists should have
been available before the crisis, but would also make the monitoring process much harder as
the authorities will lack the required documents to make sure that the touristic firms abided
with new regulations. Finally, it is easy to understand the attention that the tourism sector
received, given the high income and hard currency it provides to the state. However, this same
attention was not directed towards other sectors where most of the vulnerable workers are
employed. Based on the above, it can be said that conditional stimuli can be successful in
providing protection to vulnerable groups of workers only if efforts to overcome structural
obstacles, lack of transparency and internal biases governing the realm of labor relations were
successfully addressed.

“ Ma’ait: qorod bi- 3 melyarat gneah lil-monshaat al-syahiya wa al fondoqeya li-taghteyah igor al-a’amleen”- The Minister of finance: L.E 3 billion in loans for the tourism
sector to cover the wages-. Economy Plus, 2020. <https://bit.ly/3r5sxoY>.
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III. Rent and bill deferrals
One of the key demands of women workers in a study conducted by CEWLA84 was the
deferral or exemption of poor households from electricity and gas bills in particular. The fact
that households across Egypt have lost major components of their income, combined with
increases in prices of basic food goods has resulted in the inability of some households to
afford food, let alone gas and electricity. Denying poor households’ access to gas and electricity
due to their inability to pay bills only deepens existing inequalities, and ultimately leaves entire
families with a technology divide, lacking access to online education during the lockdown, and
inability to cook healthy meals at home. Many countries proposed and implemented deferral
programs in response to the pandemic, thus ensuring the basic needs of their most vulnerable
households continue to be met. In Canada, for example, a Utility Payment Deferral Program has
helped individuals, families and businesses85 cope with the financial impact of the COVID-19
pandemic. In Alberta alone, more than 350,000 consumers, representing 13% of the electricity
and natural gas consumption base, have made use of the program, which delayed their bills
for a period up to a year. In effect, the program ensured that “that no Albertan was cut off from
these services or saw their services reduced while the program was in place”.86
IV. Systematic targeting
Perhaps one of the key shortcomings of the EGP 500 grant was its lack of systematic
targeting. The confusion this grant created, combined with a lack of clarity on who was
targeted by it, has resulted in its inability to offer security to many subsections of Egyptian
workers, however small. In fact, CAPMAS’s latest reports estimate that only 5.4% of families in
their sample benefitted from the grant. Yet, it is unclear why some were chosen while others
were not. Similar grants in the future need to target specific subsections as opposed to the
large variegated ‘irregular’ workforce. There should be an effort to reach out to vulnerable and
irregular workers not represented by the ETUF, and not represented by other unions. And the
criteria for eligibility should be clear, including income criteria, specific sectors, or specific
living situations (e.g. female-headed households), after which everyone in these categories
should be equally receiving the grant, not just a random sample.
V. Domestic Resource Mobilization: Temporary Wealth Tax
To respond to crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, governments need to mobilize
resources. One of the modes of mobilizing resources is through international loans, like Egypt’s
2020 IMF agreement. More sustainable modes of resource mobilization are like Egypt’s 1%
84

Sherif Gamal. “Stories of Women in the Pandemic Days.”. Center for Egyptian Women Legal Aid, May 18, 2020. p. 40 [Arabic Only]

The program targeted electricity consumers, who consume less than 250,000 kilowatt hours of electricity per year, and natural gas consumers, who consume less
than 2,500 gigajoules per year.

85

86

Utility Payment Deferral, Alberta, CA. https://www.alberta.ca/utility-payment-deferral.aspx

27

Employment Security in Egypt in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Rethinking Policies and
Practices
The Pandemic and Post-Pandemic Research and Innovation Initiative at the American University in Cairo

employee taxes, levied in 2020 on formal employees nationwide for the period of one year.
While similar initiatives are a good way of mobilizing resources domestically without further
indebting the country, they also risk burdening those barely above the national minimum wage
of 2000 EGP, especially that some of them must have lost part of their household incomes
with the dismissal of a family member. The 1% employee tax is therefore a step in the right
protection but should not be the only attempt at domestic resource mobilization. In addition to
it, a similar temporary tax should be levied on wealthy individuals and corporations to ensure
that it is not only the workers and employees, even those in more stable jobs, that continue
to bear the brunt of the crisis and its handling. In particular, as the coronavirus hit the world,
many experts highlighted the wealth tax as a temporary quick way for governments to mobilize
resources to intervene on behalf of workers and vulnerable groups protecting them in times of
crises.87 This can take the shape of a one-time solidarity tax, or a wealth tax levied for a number
of months or a year. In times of crises, the poor are the most vulnerable and least protected,
therefore countries like Germany and the UK have moved towards temporarily reducing their
Value Added Tax in order to lower the burdens on everyday consumers.88 Other countries have
worked to shift this burden to the wealthiest, including Norway which increased the rates of its
existing wealth tax,89 and Argentina which introduced a progressive wealth tax of up to 3.5% on
its wealthiest domestic individuals and entities, and up to 5% on entities outside the country.90

2. LONG-TERM AND STRUCTURAL INTERVENTIONS
I. Minimum wage in the private sector (registered establishments)
Because less than 5% of the working poor in Egypt are employed in the governmental or
public/ public business sectors, it is necessary to extend the coverage of the minimum wage to
the private sector.91 This undertaking is not easy, and will meet a lot of resistance, but enforcing
it on the private sector within establishments will ensure a raise in standards of living and
salaries to a wider population of Egyptian workers, and end some of the abusive practices. In
doing so, the minimum wage should be applicable through both private sector enterprises as
well as through the ‘manpower’/ labor supply companies. Having an enforced minimum wage
nationwide is an important policy tool that can be utilized to alleviate the impacts of inflation
and soaring prices in response to crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In Australia, for
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example, the national minimum wage was used as a policy tool in 2020 and 2021 by increasing
it by 1.75% to ensure workers and employees can still afford to cover their basic needs, despite
the inflation caused by the fires and the pandemic.92 It is noteworthy that Australia has not only
a minimum wage for weekly salaried employees, but also one for hourly labor, which helps
ensure various sectors of the economy and various modes of work are covered and protected.

II. Female Workers in Surveys and Laws
Another urgent structural change relates to the elimination of the inherent gendered
biases against women’s work. The Labor Code, for example, explicitly excludes female
agricultural workers and domestic workers from the scope of its protection, and thus any
advancements of the rights of workers continue to ignore millions of women employed in both
sectors. As such, they are denied the same rights even if they work at the same job (farming
for example) and lack the legal protection, however limited, that their male counterparts enjoy.
In addition to this, crafts and jobs should be framed in government surveys as suitable to both
males and females, to ensure women are included when government policies seek to address
vulnerable work. Finally, the unemployment survey should be assessed in terms of its gender
bias, particularly in excluding “housewives” from the labor market, thus assuming any selfdeclared housewives are not job seekers, which feminist organizations have long shown not to
be an accurate assumption.93

III. Registries for the extreme poor and the poor
The EGP 500 grant has raised many issues related to targeting the poor and the vulnerable
but has also shown the dire need for central databases that make the poor and vulnerable in
society legible. These databases should be a collective effort of various government agencies,
including the social solidarity ministry, especially the takaful and karama registry, the labor
ministry registry, particularly of unregulated workers, the farmers and fisherman as registered
by the ministries of agriculture and the fisheries authority, the vulnerable migrant labor, as
registered by the immigration ministry, in addition to the civil registry, the health insurance
and social security registries, and more. The unification of a registry system will enable a better
distribution of resources, ensure there is no duplication of efforts or benefits, and efficiently
target those most in need in society.

IV. Freedom of association and right to organize
Union organization and freedom of association and collective bargaining is an important
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measure of ensuring employment security. The guarantee of freedom of association,
particularly for the most vulnerable work populations, including female agricultural workers,
domestic workers and workers in the gig economy, is a first step towards ensuring their
legibility, visibility, and ability to voice their demands, needs, and have them addressed by the
state or parliamentarians. This entails amending the Labor code, and the ratification of relevant
ILO conventions, and the removal of restrictions on the right to strike and the right to form
associations, including independent labor unions. In particular, vulnerable groups’ ability to
organize and form associations can give them more voice in explaining their challenges, thus
enabling policy makers to properly understand the issues at hand and consult with stakeholders
on the possible reforms needed.
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